UK trade policy: Domestic framework and accountability

In late 2025, we published a comprehensive analysis of the UK’s trade policy landscape: UK Trade Policy: An Independent Review. We encourage interested readers to look at the full report for more detail. Each chapter, listed below, can be read independently, with both an executive summary and key recommendations provided.

• Ch.1: UK trade and economic performance
• Ch.2: What do we know about UK trade policy
• Ch.3: Domestic dimensions of UK trade policy
• Ch.4: International dimensions of UK trade policy
• Ch.5: Trade and economic security
• Ch.6: Trade and the digital transformation
• Ch.7: Trade and sustainability
• Ch.8: Trade, employment and gender

In this series of blogs, we summarise each chapter. In this third blog we look at the domestic architecture of trade policymaking in the UK.

Debates around UK trade policy often focus on negotiations with partner countries and the geopolitical context in which those negotiations take place. However, a significant share of what determines trade outcomes lies closer to home: in the legal framework governing treaty-making, the mechanisms for parliamentary scrutiny, the structures for public consultation, and the domestic policies that shape how the UK responds to international economic pressures. Trade policy is therefore both an external and a domestic exercise. Governments negotiate internationally, but the consequences of those agreements are felt across the domestic economy and society.

This raises a central question of accountability. Trade policy is made by government, but its effects are borne by the public. The law and institutional framework for trade policy should therefore strike a balance between giving government the flexibility needed to negotiate effectively and ensuring transparency, scrutiny, and opportunities for public input.

As part of the UK Trade Policy: An Independent Review, our analysis shows that while there is legal and institutional framework established since leaving the EU, much of it relies on discretionary practices rather than binding rules. This is particularly true in relation to scrutiny of trade agreements, transparency, and stakeholder engagement. While flexibility has advantages, it raises questions about consistency, legitimacy, and accountability in the making of trade policy.

The post-Brexit landscape

The UK’s domestic trade governance framework comprises long-standing constitutional conventions plus legislation adopted since leaving the EU. Following Brexit, Parliament enacted legislation covering customs and trade remedies, agriculture and food standards, subsidy control, procurement, and investment screening. Together, these instruments provide the legal basis for an independent trade policy.

This framework is dispersed across multiple Acts, institutions, and policy domains rather than consolidated into a single integrated system. Much of the operational detail, particularly around scrutiny, consultation, and stakeholder engagement, depends on non-statutory commitments and evolving administrative practice. This combination of formal law and informal mechanisms has enabled flexibility and rapid policy development, but also contributes to variation in accountability in practice.

Treaty scrutiny and accountability

Most directly, domestic accountability meets international negotiations through the treaty ratification process. International trade agreements are negotiated by government under the Royal Prerogative, while Parliament’s formal role in ratification is governed by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act (CRAG). Under CRAG, concluded treaties must be laid before Parliament for 21 sitting days, accompanied by an explanatory memorandum, before they can be ratified. This introduces an element of parliamentary oversight.

Additional political commitments have developed alongside the statutory framework. For example, for free trade agreements, the Grimstone Rule, introduced during the passage of the Trade Act 2021, commits the government to facilitate a parliamentary debate on negotiating objectives where a relevant committee requests one, and prevents ratification until that debate has taken place. As the Grimstone Rule specifically refers to only free trade agreements, its applicability to so-called “mini-deals” is unclear.

While these mechanisms provide a baseline level of scrutiny, they were not designed for the breadth and depth of modern trade agreements. Under the CRAG, parliament cannot amend treaties and can only delay ratification under limited conditions. Formal scrutiny occurs at the end of negotiations, when the scope to influence outcomes is already constrained. As trade agreements increasingly affect domestic regulation, public services, and devolved competences, the gap between the legal process and the policy implications of these agreements has become more apparent. Parliamentary committees have repeatedly raised concerns about this imbalance.1

Our review of UK Trade Policy documents how transparency during negotiations remains largely discretionary.

Transparency, consultation, and domestic input

While the CRAG provides some level of oversight after negotiations conclude, accountability during the policy process depends on transparency and consultation. Governments have, at times, provided updates or informal engagement with committees, but these practices are not required by statute. As a result, the level of parliamentary and public engagement can vary across negotiations over time and across stakeholders. The position is even less clear for non-binding trade instruments as well as so-called “trade mini deals” (such as the UK-US EPD), which may or may not be submitted for scrutiny. Hence, the UK system reflects a strong reliance on practice rather than formal obligation.

Public consultations on prospective trade negotiations are now common, and stakeholder engagement takes place through a variety of channels, including roundtables, thematic working groups, and sector-specific discussions. Some institutions, notably the Trade Remedies Authority (TRA) and the Trade and Agriculture Commission (TAC), are established in legislation and operate with defined remits. Others have been non-statutory, time-limited, or subject to restructuring, and several earlier advisory mechanisms have been discontinued.

The result is an extensive but evolving system of engagement. The flexibility of this approach allows government to tailor consultation to specific negotiations or policy issues. However, it also makes the system difficult to assess. There is limited publicly available information on how different advisory groups relate to one another, how many there are, how representative they are, or how stakeholder input is reflected in final policy decisions.

This ad hoc approach weakens accountability. Without clearer structures, reporting, and transparency, it is difficult for Parliament, stakeholders, or the public to evaluate whether consultation is effective, inclusive, or influential.

Trade policy in a devolved UK

The devolved structure of the UK’s governance further complicates matters. Trade policy is formally a reserved power in the UK, but its impacts are unevenly distributed across the UK. Many areas affected (agriculture, environment, health) fall within devolved competence or have significant implications for devolved administrations. This creates inherent tensions in a multi-level governance system.

Post-Brexit arrangements such as Common Frameworks, the UK Internal Market Act, and the Review of Intergovernmental Relations were intended to manage these challenges. There is evidence of improved coordination and information-sharing. However, engagement with devolved administrations remains largely informal and dependent on goodwill rather than statutory rights. Limited access to timely and sufficiently disaggregated trade data is a constraint on meaningful involvement.

As trade agreements increasingly intersect with devolved regulatory space, the absence of a formal constitutional or statutory role for devolved administrations leaves a structural gap. This risks policy incoherence and political friction where trade decisions have uneven regional effects.

Strengthening domestic accountability

Our review proposes several reforms to strengthen domestic accountability. These include increasing parliamentary oversight of trade agreements and clarifying the status of “mini deals” in scrutiny processes; enhancing transparency in consultation processes; restructuring the Board of Trade as an independent body working alongside government and stakeholders; publishing an annual report on trade performance, agreement utilisation, and the barriers faced by UK firms; and giving devolved administrations a clearer statutory role in trade policy, supported by standardised data-sharing arrangements and granular trade statistics.

Trade policy is ultimately about domestic choices with international consequences. Ensuring that those choices are made transparently, subject to meaningful scrutiny, and informed by a broad range of stakeholders is central to maintaining public confidence in trade.

For the detailed analysis and full set of recommendations, please consult the complete UK Trade Policy: An Independent Review.