

Negotiating a turbulent world: The role of devolved nations in UK trade

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Key Points

- While international trade remains a reserved matter, many of the policy domains touched by trade agreements – such as agriculture, public health, and environmental protection – are devolved.
- Yet, the institutional arrangements and policymaking processes fail to meaningfully include the Devolved Administrations, both in domestic deliberations and in the UK's international trade negotiations.
- The UK internal market Act 2020 (UKIMA), designed to ensure market cohesion post-Brexit, is unable to function effectively within this context.
- In international trade agreements, there has been a lack of consideration for devolved preferences in UK-level policy actions which threaten to destabilise key regional economies.
- Treating the Devolved Administrations as partners rather than peripheral actors would not only reduce the risk of regionally and temporally incoherence outcomes but would also lead to more informed and resilient trade policymaking by Westminster.
- A clear definition and consensual agreement of competence allocation between the UK government and the Devolved Administrations is essential. By resolving the ambiguities and overlaps that currently characterise intergovernmental relations in this domain, a more stable institutional environment can be fostered.

- The development and articulation of a clear UK trade strategy would provide overarching guidance and direction for both domestic and international trade policymaking and hopefully reflecting devolved preferences. Such a strategy would establish priorities, define objectives, and offer a unified vision for engagement with global markets.

Introduction

The UK's departure from the European Union (EU) has fundamentally reshaped its trade policy environment, repatriating powers once exercised at the EU level back to the domestic arena. This shift has raised critical questions about how trade policy is formulated and implemented across the four nations of the UK. While international trade remains a reserved matter (at least from the perspective of the Government at Westminster), many of the policy domains touched by trade agreements—such as agriculture, public health, and environmental protection—are devolved to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. As a result, the Devolved Administrations have found themselves at the centre of contentious debates over how post-Brexit trade policy should be coordinated, negotiated, and delivered within this territorially diverse Union.

Despite the overlap and 'fit' between reserved trade policy and the devolved components of these larger UK-level agendas, the post-Brexit reality has been marked by tensions over the limits of devolution, the interpretation of the Sewel Convention¹, and the practical mechanisms through which the Devolved Administrations can influence UK-wide trade agendas. Instruments such as the UK Internal Market Act 2020 (UKIMA) and the operation of Common Frameworks² have further complicated intergovernmental relations, prompting concerns among devolved actors about the erosion of their policy autonomy and voice in international engagements.

Given the situation outlined above, this Briefing Paper explores the evolving position, role, and potential for the Devolved Administrations of the UK. It identifies the problems for, consequences of, and potential solutions to a more well-functioning and coherent multi-level and territorially inclusive UK trade environment.³ With trade scholars more often than not looking to the international level as their sole focus, our research⁴ reflects inwards to understand how the UK's post-Brexit 'independence' – and the turbulence that surrounds this – is shaping the domestic economy, the actors within it, and the political environment within which this all takes place. By looking

¹ The *Sewel Convention* is a normative construct whereby the UK Government and Parliament have agreed to "not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland [and other devolved nations] without the consent of the Scottish [or other devolved] Parliament[s]. As a norm, it is non-binding (as per the 2017 *Miller* case), and there have been multiple instances where the Convention has been violated by the Government at Westminster


² The *UK Common Frameworks* are a forum that seek to provide a consistent UK or Great Britain policy or standardisation across the UK for some policy areas that have been repatriated from the EU but are handled by the Devolved Administrations. The objective of this is to produce a set of relationships and communications that reduce the risk of policy incoherence across the UK economy.

³ This paper draws from the research presentations delivered by the authors as part of the 'Rethinking trade governance: The role of subnational entities' panel and 'The turbulent UK internal market - territorial politics and economics collide amid legal uncertainties' roundtable at the 2025 CIP Academic Conference, hosted at Strathclyde University. For the programme, see: <https://cip.ac.uk/academic-conference-2025-programme>.

⁴ This paper provides an overview of the work conducted by researchers at Cardiff University and Queen's University Belfast as part of CIP's *Negotiating a Turbulent World* theme.

inward, our research examines how this often international act of trade has domestic impacts, as well as how the post-Brexit landscape is reshaping the internal market dynamics of the UK itself.

Figure 1: The current situation - No coherence without a plan



The diagram in Figure 1 illustrates a self-reinforcing cycle of dysfunction within current UK trade policy governance, highlighting the interplay between institutional ambiguity, policy incoherence, and the lack of inclusion of devolved actors. The cycle begins with the overlapping or ambiguous distribution of competences between the UK Government and Devolved Administrations. This lack of clarity in powers undermines effective coordination and accountability in trade policymaking.

Further, without a clear strategic framework, trade policies tend to emerge in an *ad hoc* and fragmented manner. Resultingly, the Government at Westminster approaches each new trading relationship absent a clear plan or framework within which the negotiations, concessions, or outcomes are structured, creating opportunities for incoherence preferences from one agreement to the next, as well as opportunities for incoherence within a trade agreement to be realised, with no guiding framework acting as a backstop to prevent such instances. Simultaneously, the institutional arrangements and policymaking processes fail to meaningfully include the Devolved Administrations, both in domestic deliberations and in the UK's international trade negotiations. This lack of inclusion further weakens the legitimacy and practical efficacy of UK trade policy.

These dynamics collectively give rise to incoherent trade policies, marked by misalignment between national and devolved priorities and inconsistent application across the UK's internal market. The UKIMA, designed to ensure market cohesion post-Brexit, is unable to function effectively within this context. Its limited functionality feeds back into the broader incoherence of trade policy, perpetuating the cycle.

Origins of a problem: defining the UK's trade strategy

Framed around the rhetoric of "taking back control," the campaign to withdraw the UK from the EU portrayed the repatriation of trade policy as both a symbolic and substantive opportunity for the UK to assert its newly regained 'sovereignty'. Brexit advocates envisioned a revitalised 'Global Britain' - a free-trading, agile actor on the world stage that could once again 'rule the seas' of trade. Nearly a decade after the referendum to leave the EU, however, it remains unclear whether these ambitions have coalesced into a coherent set of trade policy objectives, let alone if the UK Government has honed a unified strategy to guide the UK's approach to trade in the turbulent post-Brexit era.

The long-promised publication of an *official* UK Trade Strategy – announced for later this year in the 'civil service spring' – is set to formalise the Westminster Government's preferred trajectory in an increasingly volatile global trade environment. Alongside other policy activities, trade policy texts are the documents outlining the trade priorities and direction for future government activities, often creating clarity and coherence. Amidst the turbulence and uncertainty from partners across the pond, this document is ever-important. The absence of an official UK trade strategy, however, speaks volumes, reflecting ongoing ambiguity about how the UK conceives of its role in global trade, as well as surrounding the principles that shape its negotiations and priorities as an independent trade entity.

Despite the lack of a UK trade strategy, research by Dr. Lindsey Garner-Knapp and Prof. Dan Wincott indicates that a trade policy – if not a formal UK government level trade strategy – is already taking shape. This policy is characterised by both continuity and change, not only in strategic direction but also in the political discourse surrounding trade. Importantly, the evolving landscape is not confined to Westminster. Each of the UK's Devolved Administrations has articulated its own distinct 'vision for trade', reflecting divergent priorities and approaches across the four nations of the territorially diverse Union.

Brexit, then, has not only reconfigured the UK's external trading relationships, especially with the EU, but has also acted as a *strategic, policy, and discursive* inflection point in the structure of the UK's domestic governance of trade. Adopting a 'four nations' perspective, we challenge the prevailing Westminster-centric framing of UK trade policy debates by foregrounding the often-overlooked role of the devolved governments. This perspective highlights how Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have actively sought to shape and influence trade policy within their own jurisdictions, and how this has major implications for how we may understand the lack of a UK trade strategy.

Conceptualising 'trade policy' as more than just a formal document – instead as a constellation of texts, practices, and discourses – this research examines how governments across the UK enact trade through actions and words rather than simply through a singular, centralised publication. In doing so, this research problematises the concept of policy and shows how trade policy is a practice, a text, and an ideology, enabling a more nuanced understanding of what trade policy is, who shapes it, and how it evolves.

While the Government at Westminster may not yet possess a written trade strategy for the UK as a *whole*, one is already in play that may be best defined as piecemeal, plural, and often contested, though nonetheless existing. While the UK's trade strategy has yet to exist on paper, in reality, the actions of subsequent UK governments and the Devolved Administrations have already put trade governance into practice, establishing it via multiple prongs. However, the complexity of trade policies and governance in the UK multilevel governance structure creates challenges for balancing which and whose policy preferences inform the UK's forthcoming trade strategy.

Consequences of a problem (1): incoherence across the union

As the preceding discussion suggests, the UK and each of its Devolved Administrations possess their own trade preferences and have adopted alternative strategies or policies that reflect this divergence. The act of articulating what all these policies collectively entail, and what this means for the shape of future trade negotiations and agreements, is a complex task. Absent a unifying plan or guiding trade strategy document from which all constituent governments might draw, or within which the preferences of all are reflected, it is little surprise that this more *ad hoc* approach to trade policy has given rise to growing signs of policy incoherence across the UK, at least in those areas of trade agreements that fall under devolved policy ownership.

In an earlier briefing, Dr. Alexander Fitzpatrick and Professor Ludvine Petetin explored how the 'fuzziness' of trade policy ownership – areas claimed simultaneously by both Westminster and the devolved governments due to the reserved nature of trade and the inclusion of devolved policy domains in increasingly transversal trade agreement texts – has fostered the conditions for regionally and temporally defined policy incoherence.⁵ This fuzziness is largely the result of a lack of legal role for devolved actors in the UK trade policy process, as well as the political desire of the Devolved Administrations to maintain legislative authority over devolved matters. This is contrasted by the Government at Westminster's preference for greater control of the trade policy space as a whole, which includes those elements of trade policies and agreements that fall under devolved competences. This regional and temporal inequality reflects the territorially diverse nature of the Union, and the lack of consideration for devolved preferences in UK-level policy actions.

The UK's recent trade agreements with New Zealand and Australia illustrate this emerging imbalance. As the first post-Brexit trade agreements signed and ratified by an 'independent Britain', these agreements further reflect the willingness of the UK to provide devolved-based concessions to new trading partners, while also showing the hand of what the UK is willing to give up moving forward. In particular, the allocation of Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) in the agricultural sector has involved concessions on traditionally protected goods such as beef and sheep meat, both of which represent a disproportionately important aspect of the more agriculturally-based economies of Wales and Scotland. Both, for example, have much higher rates of employment in agriculture-related industries relative to England, signalling the importance of domestic production for rural affairs and

⁵ <https://citp.ac.uk/publications/uneven-vulnerabilities-challenges-and-opportunities-for-the-uk-and-devolved-agricultural-sector>

employment, as well as the broader importance of the sector for the national economy. Trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand, both of which stand among the world's largest exporters of beef and sheep meat, therefore, threatens to destabilise key regional economies. As TRQs increase in volume, over time, these regionally defined impacts will likely grow in size. Preliminary evidence of this is already surfacing: in Wales, for instance, the national sheep flock has declined to record lows just one year after the New Zealand trade deal came into effect.

In the absence of a coherent UK-wide trade strategy, such fragmentation is not merely a risk—it is an inevitability, with incoherence the likely result of a lack of clear consideration of devolved preferences and interests. Agriculture starkly illustrates how regional variation matters, and the phased implementation of TRQs introduces a temporal dimension to this policy incoherence. Without deliberate efforts to coordinate, this policy incoherence will only deepen over time, with feedback effects on the economies of Wales and Scotland.

To mitigate this, a clear and inclusive UK trade strategy – one that meaningfully incorporates the voices of the Devolved Administrations – is urgently needed. Such an approach would empower the UK Government at Westminster to negotiate international agreements that genuinely reflect the diversity of preferences and priorities across the Union, rather than defaulting to a predominantly English perspective.

Far from undermining the authority of the UK state, including the Devolved Administrations in the trade policy process would enhance it. These governments bring vital, context-specific expertise such as a granular understanding of local economies, constituent preferences, and key insights of the practicalities of policy implementation. Treating the Devolved Administrations as partners rather than peripheral actors would not only reduce the risk of regionally and temporally incoherent outcomes but would also lead to more informed and resilient trade policymaking by the Government at Westminster. While there are signs that communications between the Devolved Administrations and the Government at Westminster have improved since Labour formed a government (these are largely informal), the lack of a *formal* role for devolved interests in the trade process undermines the potential of these efforts. Solidifying this role would do well to ensure that devolved interest must be considered, rather than just informally consulted. In this light, the Devolved Administrations are not obstacles to UK trade coherence, nor adversaries of those with trade competence at the UK level; Instead, they are essential contributors to its realisation and to the strengthening of the Union itself.

Consequences of a problem (2): competence overlap and UK trade

Research led by the Queen's University Belfast team of the Negotiating a Turbulent World Research Theme – comprising Dr. Lisa Claire Whitten, Dr. Viviane Gravey, and Prof. Billy Melo-Araujo – offers a fresh and nuanced perspective on the intricate relationship between the UK Government at Westminster and the Devolved Administrations, focusing particularly on the complexities arising from overlapping competencies and regulatory ambiguities. In response to concerns that devolved powers might be undermined amid the UK's reassertion of control over its external trade policy – despite the fuzziness that exists and was flagged above – their work

highlights how substantive new trade agreements (as well as international agreements more broadly) negotiated by the UK Government heavily intersect with devolved competences. Specifically, this research identifies clear overlaps between UK free trade agreements (FTAs) concluded between mid-2017 and mid-2024 and matters traditionally within the remit of the Devolved Administrations, with initial findings indicating 91% of the UK's trade agreements having some overlap⁶. The scale of these policy complexities has clear implications for the autonomy of Devolved Administrations in these areas, forcing us to figure out where the fuzziness of trade policy ownership begins and ends.

Despite the scale of overlaps between the reach of UK trade agreements and devolved policy competencies, this research finds that only a limited number of legal adjustments have been necessary across Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in order to implement these agreements. This suggests that, to date, the regulatory impact of UK trade agreements on devolution has been quite restrained rather than transformative. However, envisaging UK trade policy as having little legal impact on the devolved nations does not capture the full picture. Central UK Government strategies such as the enactment of the UKIMA in 2020, which was partly designed to facilitate independent UK trade policy, have introduced new constraints on the policy-making autonomy of the Devolved Administrations. Moreover, many provisions within the UK's FTAs reinforce existing UK-wide regulations rather than introduce novel, devolved regulatory frameworks; thereby reducing the need for changes to devolved laws, even when new FTA provisions touch on devolved policy areas. This suggests that the implementation of UK trade policies may, in effect, circumvent devolved actors by requiring little to no legislative intervention on their part in order for aspects of the trade policy to come into play.

Building on these findings, this research engages with broader questions about the substantive regulatory significance of contemporary trade agreements and offers original insights into the domestic regulatory ramifications of UK trade policy in the post-Brexit context. Rather than looking at the role of the devolved in UK trade policymaking, this work highlights the ways in which the Devolved Administrations may have their policy autonomy 'captured' by UK trade policies without or with little active involvement in this process itself.

A possible solution? The UKIMA as a clarifying tool

As the UK departed from the EU's single market, it faced its own set of challenges; most notably, navigating the complexities of its internal market across the distinct economies of its constituent nations. Non-tariff barriers continue to pose significant obstacles to trade within the UK, with Northern Ireland's unique position post-Brexit adding further complexity. We have identified three core issues with the current structure and politics of the UKIMA⁷, underscoring the urgent need to reevaluate and reform it for smoother operation.

⁶ <https://citp.ac.uk/publications/trade-and-devolution>

⁷ The United Kingdom Internal Market Act (UKIMA) 2020 is a piece of legislation, passed by Westminster, designed (in principle) to reduce or prevent internal trade barriers within the UK domestic market to provide a more centre-projected and coherent internal trade agenda. In effect, the UKIMA restricts the powers and roles of the Devolved Administrations in setting their own, devolved policies and standards due to the market access principles at the heart of the Act.

First, despite the UK's stated ambition to 'take back control' and desire to establish an independent 'British' trade policy, the UKIMA incorporates the market access principles from the EU single market within its own internal market legislation. In an effort to break free from the EU's shadow, the Government at Westminster has drawn heavily from the very market model it sought to leave behind, emulating many of the EU's market principles such – such as mutual recognition and non-discrimination – at home via the UKIMA. The UKIMA, therefore, in many ways represents a continuation of trade policies and perspectives that were shaped during the UK's EU membership. As Oscar Wilde famously remarked, "imitation is the sincerest form of flattery that mediocrity can pay to greatness," and the UK's adoption of EU principles in its internal market has resulted in a somewhat clumsy and imperfect replication compared to the more finely tuned EU original.

Second, although the UK has transplanted many EU market mechanisms, the constituent nations have yet to agree on the foundational principles that underpin the UK's internal market (as they did not give consent to the Act). While devolution mattered before the UK's exit, the borders and assertions of devolved policy-making appear to be hardening, with the divergent preferences of this territorially diverse Union becoming more apparent. As such, breaking away from the EU appears to be presenting the UK with an increasingly fractured domestic economy that it sought to mend through the UKIMA. Consequently, the UKIMA represents a goal without a clear consensus on either how to achieve it or whether the goal itself is universally accepted by all nations of the UK. The case of COVID-19 PPE procurement starkly illustrates this lack of alignment, with devolved governments eventually excluded from UK Government meetings due to UK ministerial discomfort over the Devolved Administrations' elevated roles in UK-level policy-making. During a period demanding coordinated action, tensions arose over who deserved a seat at the table and the extent of devolved influence.

In more routine policy matters, such as bottle return schemes – where consumers pay a deposit on single-use bottles which is refundable upon return – similar discord emerges, signalling that territorially diverse preferences exist in policies that are pressing as well as mundane. Despite the UKIMA's legal framework, a truly unified internal market that accommodates the needs and preferences of all UK nations remains elusive. For instance, Wales intends also to include glass bottles in its bottle return scheme, whilst Scotland, England and Northern Ireland have chosen to focus on metal and plastics. This divergence means that Welsh producers using glass bottles face added costs not borne by their counterparts in England, Northern Ireland or Scotland, potentially placing them at a competitive disadvantage or forcing them to absorb costs that reduce their profitability and investment capacity. These territorial differences reveal how the Devolved Administrations wield significant influence—effectively a veto over internal market policies, highlighting persistent tensions around the balance of economic decision-making powers within the UK.

Third, while the UKIMA aims to govern the internal market across the UK, Northern Ireland's situation reveals a distinct set of priorities. For Northern Ireland, maintaining access to the EU single market – particularly the Republic of Ireland – takes precedence over integration with Great Britain. The Northern Ireland Protocol and Windsor Framework therefore exert far greater influence on business decisions than the UKIMA does for

Northern Irish businesses and producers. This dual identity, as both a UK nation and an entity with privileged access to the EU market, therefore, places Northern Ireland in a uniquely complex position amid ongoing international trade tensions, including those stemming from US tariffs. Uncertainties over which tariffs – UK or EU – apply to goods produced or imported into Northern Ireland further complicate matters. Moving forward, it will be critical to monitor whether Northern Irish businesses increasingly align their economic interests with the UK or the EU in response to these pressures. This issue not only challenges the cohesion and objectives of the UKIMA but also carries significant implications for the all-island economy of Ireland, given Northern Ireland's growing trade relationship with the Republic of Ireland, which saw the proportion of exports to the Republic doubling in recent years. Ultimately, the question extends beyond the UKIMA's effectiveness to its very relevance for the UK *as a whole*.

Reflecting on the role of the devolved administrations' potential at the WTO


Looking beyond the shores of the UK, Daniela Janikova of Queen's University Belfast in her ongoing PhD thesis explores the role that Devolved Administrations could play at the international level for the betterment of the international trade order as well as for the production of more effective trade results at home. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has maintained its state-centric approach to institutionalism, holding both regulatory and institutional dimensions. The WTO serves as a platform for negotiation, monitoring, deliberation, and dispute settlement among its members, but fails to either acknowledge or formally recognise substate actors (such as the UK's Devolved Administrations) as meaningful participants in the multilateral trading system. Reflecting on the opening sections of this Briefing Paper, this ignorance is problematic not least in the UK case as the Devolved Administrations hold legislative and governing authority over many policy domains that are increasingly captured by transversal trade agreements. Identifying ways in which substate actors may engage with the multilateral trading system, therefore, presents as an opportunity for the international level to have more specific and focussed input from actors that implement these policies on the ground, while also providing a voice to those that have until now been excluded from the trade process.

Including substate actors such as the Devolved Administrations within the framework of the WTO, however, is not a simple task and requires that we examine whether the existing structure and forums can accommodate these actors or whether new institutional structures ought to be devised. The WTO structure is complex, consisting of the Ministerial Conference, several specialised Councils, and various committees and working groups. As for attendance and representation, the WTO rules of procedure provide that each Member shall be represented by an accredited representative, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisors, as needed. In practice, this usually translates into meetings being attended by ministers with foreign trade competence and other senior officials who act in the name of their state. On this basis, the formal inclusion of substate representatives lies in a grey space that is neither mandated nor prohibited, providing ample opportunities for the UK to involve the Devolved Administrations as substate actors in WTO actions *alongside* UK-level representation.

In addition to including the Devolved Administrations within existing rules or frameworks, alternatives also exist via the opportunities to develop new forums to specifically facilitate substate actors to deliberate on relevant issues. Underlying this inclusion, however, it would be useful for WTO Members to first develop a set of guidelines that outline the capacity and scope of this 'new' involvement, and the extent to which the actions and preferences of substate actors at the WTO are binding or advisory. Navigating this development that both empowers substate actors while also ensuring the authority of nation states is not undermined requires a delicate political dance at home as well as at the international level. Considering the preferences of other states such as Spain, Canada, or Belgium, for example, which all have substate actors and independence movements, one may imagine that providing greater voice to substate actors is not in their national interest, perhaps constraining the increased involvement of the Devolved Administrations who may otherwise set the tone for substate inclusion at the WTO. As such, greater inclusion of the Devolved Administrations at the WTO level requires as much consideration for international preferences as it does for domestic ones.

Looking ahead: another UK approach to trade governance

Figure 2: The solution - Cleaning up the rough edges for a coherent and well-defined domestic market



This revised version of the diagram presented earlier in this Briefing Paper outlines a virtuous cycle for achieving a more coherent and effective UK trade policy framework. It identifies three foundational conditions that, if met, could foster more aligned and functional trade governance across the UK.

First, the development and articulation of a clear UK trade strategy would provide overarching guidance and direction for both domestic and international trade policymaking. Such a strategy would establish priorities, define objectives, and offer a unified vision for engagement with global markets.

Second, the clear definition and consensual agreement of competence allocation between the UK government and the Devolved Administrations is essential. This is particularly the case with competences that have been repatriated from the EU and have had to be relearned by the UK. The lack of clear understanding or mutual agreement on which government or institution has responsibility for UK trade policy on paper and in practice, for example, creates fuzziness. By resolving the ambiguities and overlaps that currently characterise intergovernmental relations in this domain, a more stable institutional environment can be fostered.

Third, ensuring that devolved actors are meaningfully included in trade policy processes – both domestically and in international representation – would enhance legitimacy, democratic accountability, and policy relevance.⁸ Inclusion would enable local concerns and perspectives to be incorporated early and substantively into trade negotiations and decisions.

Collectively, these three conditions lead to the development of coherent trade policies. Such policies are more likely to be internally consistent, aligned with the UK's strategic objectives, and acceptable to all constituent parts of the UK.

As governance is improved and tensions over market access diminish, the UKIMA framework functions more effectively. In turn, reduced UKIMA-related barriers reinforce policy coherence by minimizing internal frictions and enabling smoother intergovernmental coordination.

Conclusion

We have highlighted the challenges faced by UK trade policy and the role of the Devolved Administrations in creating and overcoming these challenges. As a country that has sought to push forward as a sovereign trading partner in its own right, our research highlights that the UK first needs to define its own internal market and ensure things 'at home' are in order before it can more fully embark on a clear trajectory at the international level. Defining a clear UK trade strategy that works for the *whole* of the UK, clarifying competence distributions and the 'ownership' of trade policy, as well as meaningfully including the Devolved Administrations in the trade process both at home and abroad, will likely enable the Government at Westminster to overcome many of the problems identified by our research. Furthermore, addressing these issues will enable coherent policy to be made across the UK, reducing regionally and temporally defined negative impacts from decisions taken by the central government. Doing so not only holds promise for the long-term stability of the UK economy but would further support the smooth functioning of the UK internal market and aid in clarifying the objectives of this market in a holistic fashion.

⁸ <https://citp.ac.uk/publications/addressing-barriers-for-welsh-institutions-and-civil-society-to-contribute-to-uk-trade-policy>

